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LABoR LA.w-LrnoR-MANAGEMENT Rm.AnoNs ACT-A.Nn-FEATHBRBEDDING

PROVISION-The typographers union insisted that newspaper publishers, upon
using advertising mats as molds for metal castings from which to print advertisements, pay typesetters, at regular rates, for setting up duplicate forms for
such advertisements in the same manner as though mats were not used, which
duplicate forms are ordinarily melted down without having been used. The
musicians union insisted that a theater employ a local orchestra, as a condition
of the union's consent to the local appearance of traveling bands, to play overtures, intermissions and chasers. The publishers association and the theater
challenged these demands as attempts to exact payments for services not performed or not to be performed within the anti-featherbedding provision of Title
I of the Labor-Management Relations Act [section 8(b)(6)].1 The National
Labor Relations Board dismissed both complaints,2 the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the Board's decision in the Newspaper case,3 but the Sixth Circuit reversed the
Board in the Theater case.4 On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit in American Newspaper Publishers Association v. NLRB, 345 U.S.
100, 73 S.Ct. 552 (1953), and reversed the Sixth Circuit and upheld the Board's
dismissal in NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117, 73 S.Ct. 560
(1953).
Featherbedding, as a form of trade union reaction to the problem of obsolescence of labor due to technological improvements, has had a somewhat violent

161 Stat. L. 140-142, §8(b)C6) (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §158(b)C6).
2 In the Matter of International Typographers Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 951 (1949); In
the Matter of American Federation of Musicians, Local 24, 92 N.L.R.B. 1528 (1951).
s American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 782.
4 Gamble Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, (6th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 61.
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and confused history at common law.5 Congress6 and some of the state legislatures7 have at various times tried to deal with the wasteful practices which have
resulted from efforts to maintain job security in a society which promotes technological advancement and tries to keep management functions in the hands of
management The principal cases indicate that the legislative approach represented by section 8(b)(6) will not solve the basic problem.8 In reaching these
decisions the Supreme Court was cognizant of the intention of Congress not to
condemn broadly all featherbedding practices, and the Court seems to have
affirmed th~ many doubts which were expressed concerning the efficacy of section 8(b)(6) in stopping featherbedding.9 The present provision10 was the
result of a compromise between the strongly worded House bill11 and the lack
5 For a history of featherbedding practices, see TELLER, THE LAw GOVERNING LAlloR
Th:sPaTBS AND CoLLBCTIVB BARGAINING §89 (1940); 34 CoRN. L.Q. 255 (1948); 52 CoL.
L. RBv. 1020 (1952).
6 Before the Lea Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress attempted to deal with
violence in labor disputes including those involving featherbedding practices. 48 Stat. L.
979 (1934), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1951. In the case which led to
the passage of the Lea Act, it was decided that demands for standby pay when recorded
music was being broadcast were not in violation of the anti-trust laws even though a
restriction on labor saving devices would result. United States v. American Federation of
Musicians, (D.C. ID. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 304, affd. 318 U.S. 741, 63 S.Ct. 665 (1942).
7 For a discussion of state legislation dealing with featherbedding practices, see TELLER,
THE LAw GoVERNING LAlloR ThsPaTBS AND CoLLECTIVB BARGAINING §89 et seq. (1940).
s For a discussion of the current problems of job security, see TELLER, MANAGEMENT
FUNCTIONS UNDER CoLLBCTIVB BARGAINING 139 et seq. (1947) (with suggestions regarding guaranteed annual wage policies); Cox, "Some Aspects of the Labor-Management
Relations Act-1947," 61 HARv. L. R:sv. 274 at 288 (1948) [discussing the effect of §8(b)(6)
on severance pay]. See also 26 N.Y. UNIV, L. R:sv. 685 (1951).
9 This doubt was expressed by one of the sponsors of the act: HARTLEY, Oun NEW
NATIONAL LAlloR PoLICY 157 (1948). See also, VAN Ama!L, AN ANALYSIS oF nm LABORMANAGEMENT R:sunoNs Acrr, 1947, 59-60 (1947); TELLER, TBB LAw GOVERNING LAlloR
Th:sPaTBS AND CoLLBCTIVB BARGAINING-1950 Supp. §398.102 (1950); 51 CoL. L. R:sv.
1020 at 1033 (1952); S. Rep. No. 986, Pt. 3, pp. 58-61, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948).
10 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- • • •
"(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or
deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction for services which
are not performed or not to be performed."
11 Section 12(a)(3)(B) of H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947), made it an
unlawful concerted activity to call, authorize, engage in, or assist "any strike or other
concerted interference with an employer's operations, an object of which is to compel an
employer to accede to featherbedding" which is defined in §2(17) as a "practice which has
as its purpose or effect requiring an employer"(A) to employ or agree to employ any person or persons in excess of the number of
employees reasonably required by such employer to perform actual services; or
"CB) to pay or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of value in lieu of
employing, or on account of failure to employ, any person or persons, in connection with
the conduct of the business of an employer, in excess of the number of employees reasonably
required by such employer to perform actual services; or
"(C) to pay or agree to pay more than once for services performed; or
"CD) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of value for
services, in connection with the conduct of a business, which are not to be performed; or
"CE) to pay or agree to pay any tax or exaction for the privilege of, or account of,
producing, preparing, manufacturing, selling, buying, renting, operating, using, or main-
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of any mention of featherbedding in the Senate bill. 12 The House provision was
based on the Lea Act,13 whose constitutionality was being challenged14 at the
time of the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act. It was during the
debates on the Taft-Hartley amendments that the proponents of the legislation
made it clear that section 8(b)(6) was to have a limited effect on featherbedding
practices. 15 The court interpreted the language of section 8(b)(6) to mean that
if any services are performed, whether or not these services are useful to the
employer, whether or not these services are desired by the employer, and whether
or not these services are detrimental to the employer,16 there could not be an
unfair labor practice.11 The contention that the work done in the principal cases
constituted merely token services was rejected, and the Court held that the pay-

taining any article, machine, equipment, or materials; or to accecle to or impose any restriction upon the production, preparation, manufacture, sale, purchase, rental, operation, use,
or maintenance of the same, if such restriction is for the purpose of preventing or limiting
the use of such article, machine, equipment, or materials."
12 S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947). Senator Taft agreed with the objectives of
the House bill, but felt that it would be impOSS1ole for courts to determine the exact number
of men required to perform a given function in hundreds of industries. 93 CoNG. R:sc.
6443 (1947). The House, in attempting to defend its provision, stated, "When any question arises as to whether or not a uuion demands more people than are 'reasonably required'
to do certain work, industrial engineers and time-study people can, and constantly do, resolve
the question by reliable, scientific methods." H. Rep. No. 245 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong.,
1st sess., p. 25 (1947).
13 60 Stat. L. 89 (1946), 47 U.S.C. (1946) §506. The Lea Act (popularly known as
the Petrillo Act) made it a criminal offense to force a licensee to do the things proscribed
in H.R. 3020 in the broadcasting industry.
14 The constitutionality of the Lea Act was upheld in United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 1538 (1947), in which it was claimed that the statute did not adequately
describe the offense since there was no way to tell how many men were reasonably required
to perform a given job. On remand, the charges were dismissed. United States v. Petrillo,
(D.C. ill. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 176.
15 While discussing the applicability of §8(b)(6), Senator Taft made the following
observations:
"It is intended to make it an unfair labor practice for a man to say, 'You must have IO
musicians, and if you insist there is room for only 6, you must pay for the other 4 anyway.'
That is in the nature of an exaction from the employer for services which he does not want,
does not need, and is not even willing to accept." 93 CoNG. R:sc. 6446 (1947).
"Of course this section does not affect such industrial practices [vacations, rest periods,
demands for full pay when an employee reports for work at his employer's request and finds
there is no work for him that day], as such activities are done at an employer's request and
for valuable consideration incident to the employment itself." 93 CoNG. R:sc. 6859 (1947).
16 "Bogus" work cost the New York Times $150,000 a year and the Theater Corporation claimed that the additional orchestra would interfere with its productions. For a discussion of the activities and methods of the Musicians Union, see Countryman, ''The
Organized Musicians,'' 16 Umv. Cm. L. R:sv. 56 (1948), 239 (1949).
17 When an employer hired a non•uuion worker in violation of a valid (pre-1947)
closed shop agreement, it has been held that a demand for pay for the benefit of the uuion
worker who would have gotten the job if the employer had observed the agreement was not
a violation of §8(b)(6). The court said, " ••• to read into the section a requirement that
the work must have been done by the one to receive the wages not only would bar a justified
claim such as this on the part of one wrongfully deprived of a job under the contract, but
also would warp section 8(b)(6) into a broader provision than it was intended to be.''
Rabouin v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 906 at 912.
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ments for the typesetters ''bogus" was just one facet of an overall bona fide employment plan, and distinguished the musicians' demands from their former
demands for "stand by" pay which were clearly prohibited by section 8(b)(6).18
The congressional debates and the watering-down of the House bill clearly
indicate that Congress intended the words "services which are not performed"
to apply only to situations where no work was to be performed and that Congress
did not intend to require that the services performed be valuable to or desired
by an employer. If Congress had so intended, it would have been simple to add
the words valuable and desired. The Court has therefore left the question of
"make work" projects to collective bargaining, and the present state of the law
may be adequately expressed in the words of NLRB Member Reynolds: "Under
their [majority] construction of the section, unions can avoid liability in all circumstances by the simple expedient of insisting upon the performance of nonexistent and unwanted work tasks.''19
Walter H. Weiner, S.Ed.

18 Justice Jackson, who agreed with the majority in the Newspaper Publishers case,
dissented in the Gamble case because the Musicians Union was using a new device to
accomplish job security, while there was a fifty year history of ''bogus" typesetting. A
similar view is advanced in 52 CoL. L. REv. 1020 at 1030 (1952).
19 In the Matter of American Federation of Musicians, note 2 supra, at 1536. In
Cement Finishers Local No. 627 (A.F.L.) and R. H. Parr and Son, 22 L.R.R.M. 1289
(1948), the union admitted that six men received pay when only two men worked and
reimbursed the employer by stipulation. If this remedy will apply in a contested case is as
yet unknown.

